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We seem to meet the same difficulty met when we held that action is free in the sense of undetermined. There we said: Why take thought if thought does not determine action? Here we are inclined to say: Why take thought if the action was determined before the thought occurs?

At the worst the position of experimental determinism shares this difficulty with the theory of indeterminism; as well as with any metaphysical deterministic theory, such as that which holds that action is determined by entelechy or God or providence; so that we are left to choose our theory on other considerations than this. But I am disposed to question whether the difficulty exists for experimental determinism; it appears to result from a wrong notion of what such determinism implies. The notion that seems to make my own individuality count for nothing in action, is that the action was already worked out, "scheduled," computable, in some sense existent, before it occurred; before I existed. But experimental determinism does not imply this; it implies only that if what now occurs were different, the earlier conditions would have been different; though what now occurs need not be predictable from nor existent in those earlier conditions; it is determinism in a backward view, not necessarily in a forward one. Combinations in me may be such as have not occurred before, giving results not to be known till they appear, so that my action has all the interest of the unknown, the novel; my individuality is precisely what makes this particular result possible, so that I am indeed creative. I could not possibly hold this if what I am does not determine my action; nor could I hold it if I conceive that my action is but a coming into view of a preexistent entelechy. Experimental determinism presents the just basis for formulable science, for rational conduct of life, and for creative evolution.

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DR. DAWES HICKS ON REALITY AND ITS APPEARANCES

DR. HICKS'S general theory of the nature of physical objects is markedly realistic, if we take this term to mean predominantly non-subjectivist—appearances "evince themselves as ways in which the reality itself is apprehended—as partial, imperfect, incomplete ways in which the reality is known;"—in no sense are they "independent of, and separate from, the reality of which they are appearances."¹ Further, they "are not objects, but ways in which objects

¹ *Appearance and Real Existence* (Proc.: *Aristotelian Soc.*: 1913-14, pp. 33-36). In connection with this article should be read its predecessor (*Sense-Presentation and Thought*, 1906).

are apprehended. It is of *things* that we are immediately aware, while presentations as such are not immediately known;" and "not to produce [sense-qualities] but to become aware of them, is the function of conscious process" (p. 45).

1. Merely in order to elucidate the position on which such criticism as I have to offer is based I venture to express my complete agreement thus far with Dr. Hick's view: Appearance, briefly, is always partial reality,² and never otherwise unreal; "there is no ground for regarding the appearance as a third existent," additional to the real thing and the knowing mind (p. 46). At the same time, it appears to me that the complete development of Dr. Hicks's theory is such that we are in the end (*a*) debarred from ever knowing reality itself (as he holds that we do)³ and (*b*) as an inevitable consequence of this incapacity, we are also unable to set up any distinction whatever between reality and appearance—we can not, *i. e.*, know appearances to be such, because we can possess no real criterion wherewith to determine their character.

A possible ambiguity appears to lie however in the phrases "way in which reality is known," "ways in which objects are apprehended;" for the word "way" here in itself might refer either to the *process of our knowing* or to the *content known*; it might mean either the way in which we know, or on the other hand, the mode in which reality manifests itself—its significance, *i. e.*, may be either epistemological or ontological. But of these possible meanings, the first must be excluded—the reference is throughout ontological—to reality and its mode of manifestation. For it seems to be fundamental that if we know at all, we know reality, and never anything other;⁴ the only question being just how much of reality we know in each particular case—the answer depending on the degree in which the conditions necessary are fulfilled.

But here a crucial difficulty appears to arise, when Dr. Hicks continues (p. 39): The physical object "is distinguished from other objects, and its characteristics are discriminated, but always imperfectly, and in fragmentary fashion . . . the object is apprehended only incompletely;" and the difficulty arises from the word "always" here, for I would submit, if the object is thus discriminated, distinguished, apprehended, *always* imperfectly and incompletely, then it must be impossible for us ever to know physical reality as such in

² I think further that error consists in regarding any entity as Real, when it is only Appearance, thus understood: I believe this view agrees with Dr. Bosanquet's treatment in *Logic*, Vol. 1, p. 383.

³ "It is of things that we are immediately aware" (p. 36).

⁴ This principle of course settles nothing as to the nature of reality or of knowledge—both questions remain quite open.

any way; and that being so, also impossible for us to know appearance as being appearance, to know that the apprehended content is imperfect and incomplete. For Dr. Hicks's article concludes with a reference to "the conditions which space imposes even where apprehension has attained its highest degree of accuracy" (p. 48); this "highest degree," however, always falling short of the completeness of reality itself.

There can be no question of course as to the imperfection of what is apprehended in by far the vast majority of instances, in which the inevitable fragmentariness becomes supplemented by the mind's ideal content and reference; for it is only under these conditions that knowledge is at all possible for finite subjects; and in minds of a low order—*e. g.*, in animals—this incompleteness need never be transcended; only in that case the distinction between reality and appearance never arises, and appearances as such are not distinguished at all; naïve consciousness, again, never attains to any philosophic—*i. e.*, reasoned—distinction between these categories, and the term "real" has there no rationalized meaning.

But when consciousness becomes reflective it seems to me that it is impossible that any knowledge of "imperfection" should ever arise—or any judgment of "incomplete" be made—unless we can attain somehow to the immediate apprehension of perfect and complete reality; for both these terms are negatively derivative, and all negation demands some positive affirmative basis.⁵ It is impossible to know that anything is incomplete unless we also know the standard compared with which it is imperfect; as Dr. Hicks himself points out, "it is precisely in this contrast between the imperfect, the partial, and the perfect, the complete, that the significance of what is denoted appearance is to be discerned" (p. 39); but if, as he at the same time asserts, physical objects are discriminated *always* imperfectly, then the problem at once arises as to how the indispensable standard of the perfect and complete physical object⁶ is ever to be obtained. If this is not given objectively, if it is not immediately⁷ known, then it can have only a subjective, which may even mean in the end a solipsistic, origin; it must be supplied from and arise in the individual mind itself. Nor even thus could the essential difficulty of Dr. Hicks's position be overcome; for even were it admitted that the required criterial idea could be formed wholly by

⁵ "Negation *qua* negation has no significance" (Bosanquet, *Logic*, Vol. I., p. 282).

⁶ It must be noted that the problem is here restricted to the knowledge of real physical objects; for if the question becomes widened to that of Reality as a whole, then of course everything is known but incompletely, and the completeness of the Real becomes a postulate based on all our experience.

⁷ In Dr. Hicks's own sense of this term.

the mind itself, still this could only be on the foundation of its immediate objective experience; but again if this be *always* of the imperfect then the development of this idea appears to be wholly impossible.

In fact Dr. Hicks himself asserts that "in numerous cases the apprehending act results in a gradual lessening of the incompleteness of its apprehension" (p. 40); *i. e.*, I take it, of the incompleteness of the apprehended content. Now what prevents this lessening proceeding so far, under proper conditions, that the initial imperfection vanishes altogether, and the completely real itself becomes known? Indeed it would seem that unless, the proper conditions being fulfilled, we are immediately conscious of the real qualities—the real weight, temperature, size, *etc.*:—of physical objects, exact science would be wholly impossible.

2. But even if we admit (a) that "the object is apprehended only incompletely" and (b) that the "imperfect ways in which the reality is known" constitute appearance, still another essential characteristic of appearance is adduced by Dr. Hicks; for (p. 46) "In and through the apprehending act there is awareness of certain features, and it is this awareness of a group of its features that constitutes that group, as the content of the act of apprehension, an appearance as contrasted with the real existing thing." And with this criterion, as with the other, it seems to me that the mind is once again absolutely debarred from ever knowing reality at all. Hitherto the apprehended content is constituted appearance because of its incompleteness or imperfection; and I have suggested the possibility of this defectiveness vanishing, whereupon the resultant content, being complete, would therefore be real. But in the passage last cited it is not the *incompleteness* of the group of features, but our *awareness* of it, that constitutes appearance; and since there must be awareness in every apprehending act, it follows at once that every apprehended content without exception can be no more than appearance—that we can never therefore transcend appearance and attain reality. Dr. Hicks's first characteristic of appearance, incompleteness of the content, might possibly be remedied; but his second, being an essential factor in the mind's very activity, can never be removed.

3. Nor, further, are Dr. Hicks's two criteria in any way connected, but rather seem arbitrarily independent of each other; whereas if reality is one, it would seem reasonable to suppose that there must be some essential connection between all the conditions which determine appearance. But if the incompleteness of any content constitutes its appearance, still we can not find in that characteristic anything whatever to suggest that our awareness of that content is also an essential factor; the one is, on Dr. Hick's own

theory of reality, an objective characteristic, the other is a subjective attribute of the apprehending mind.

Finally, Dr. Hicks's second criterion appears really incompatible with his previous assertions that (a) "appearances will not have a mode of existence . . . separate from reality" (p. 33), and (b) "the external object is in no way altered or affected through the fact of being apprehended" (p. 46)—this object of course being real. For if now our awareness constitutes any content appearance, and if further this awareness is "in and through the apprehending act," then it seems to be a perfectly logical conclusion that ultimately it is the apprehending act that determines appearance to be such; but if at the same time the external real object itself remains unaltered and unaffected, then the appearance (determined by apprehension) and the object (unaffected thereby) can be no degree identical; and there is thus set up a dualism between the real object and the appearance; a dualism which, again, if the appearance is but the incomplete way in which reality is known, is unfounded; for an incomplete entity is not, merely on that account, distinct from the complete, but rather the contrary.

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REVIEWS AND ABSTRACTS OF LITERATURE

Proposiciones relativas al Porvenir de la Filosofía. JOSÉ INGENIEROS. Buenos Aires: Casa Vaccaro. 1918. Pp. 149.

This work is very interesting and instructive, and it is perhaps the most truly philosophical work that has ever been written in South America.

The author has already published a good many works, most of them being on sociological subjects, and has contributed important articles to the *Revista de Filosofía*, of Buenos Aires.

In this last work of his, he does not intend to give us a system of philosophy. His aim is more modest. He simply formulates a certain number of propositions which he believes are to be the basis of the metaphysics of the future.

According to the author, all past attempts at metaphysics have been a decided failure. This has been due to the fact that metaphysicians have been insincere. A whole chapter of the work is devoted to the so-called "hypocrisy of the philosophers." These philosophers, frightened by the memory of Socrates, Hypatia and Bruno, have always endeavored to harmonize their systems with vulgar beliefs, religious as well as political. And their philosophy